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El artículo ofrece una introducción de las características generales de los sistemas
modernos de energía i de los retos que se derivan de ellos, seguida de un análisis de la
posible evolución que tendrá la disponibilidad del combustible fósil. A continuación se
centrará en las condiciones y las posibilidades de la transformación del sistema ener-
gético a largo plazo.
L’article ofereix una introducció de les característiques generals dels sistemes moderns
d’energia i dels reptes que se’n deriven, seguida d’una anàlisi de la possible evolució
que tindrà la disponibilitat del combustible fòssil. A continuació se centrarà en les
condicions i les possibilitats de la transformació del sistema energètic a llarg termini.
The article gives an introduction to general characteristics of modern energy systems
and resulting challenges, followed by an analysis of the possible development of fossil
fuel availability. The subsequent part will discuss requirements and options for far-
reaching energy system transformation.
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy,
Security, and System Transformation
*     *     *
*     *     *
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In recent years, questions regarding energy supply have risen on the public
agenda, driven by events like Katrina and the resulting shortfalls in fossil fuel
production and refining. These questions have also grown in importance because
of a sharp increase in energy demand from countries like China, India, but also
rapidly growing industrialized countries like the USA. Natural disasters and
serious electricity blackouts in a number of countries show how dependent
our societies—in industrialized as well as developing countries—are on the
constant supply of energy. Ongoing terrorist attacks on facilities of the fossil
fuel industry also show how fragile our energy infrastructures are, on all levels,
from the global to the local.
Characteristics of Modern Energy Systems
The vulnerability of modern energy systems is a function of their complex
characteristics. First, heavy use of carbon-rich fossil fuels is one defining feature
of today’s global energy complex. Oil, coal and natural gas dominate. Low-
carbon nuclear fuels and renewable energies play a secondary role. Different
energy carriers have different specific infrastructural requirements and
implications on system vulnerability. In some cases, supply is secure, in some
cases not. In some cases, substitutes are readily available, in others not. The
primary energy carrier coal is mainly converted to the secondary energy carriers
electricity and heat. The same holds true to a lesser degree for natural gas. Oil
is dominating in the transportation sector; in heating it is in some countries
also important. Renewable energy sources are used for electricity, transportation
and heating.
Second, for decades, the energy industry, especially in electricity generation,
has used economies of scale, building infrastructures comprised of large
generation units and large-scale transmission lines and distribution networks.
Centralization was the result.
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Third, modern energy systems and modern economies need a constant energy
supply—no interruptions, “24/7”—hence the need for constant security of
supply. There is nothing more “dangerous” to modern economies than
experiencing an unforeseen disruption. Unlike oil, which can easily be stored
in tanks, storing electricity is extremely difficult. Technologies for efficient large-
scale storage are not on the markets.
Fourth, extrapolating historical trends, world energy demand will steadily increase
in the future. (In this context it has to be mentioned that ever increasing energy
consumption is not at all a prerequisite of economic development, least of all an
iron law, because of available energy efficiency potentials even in industrialized
countries.) In sum, today’s global energy system is characterised by:
· Heavy use of fossil fuels;
· Centralized and large scale structures throughout the supply chains;
· Reliable 24/7 supply;
· Rapidly growing demand.
Specifically fossil energy also shows a number of specific characteristics. The number
of relevant oil and gas suppliers is decreasing, whereas the number of relevant
consumers—mostly from the large group of developing countries—is increasing
(EU 2004, IEA 2004). The remaining suppliers are growing more dominant, gaining
more market power and more political power. Import dependence is growing, and
will grow much more in coming decades. Remaining reserves are more expensive
to extract. Finally, supply lines cover ever greater distances.
Disruption of Supply and Causes of Vulnerability
The requirement of constant supply is the major cause of vulnerability. In
other words, disruption of supply is the major threat to fossil-fuel-dependent
economies. It is the “background noise” that sets the context. Here, there is a
difference between the concrete disruption of supply (notably terrorism, strikes
and political risks) and general causes of vulnerability (import dependence,
rapidly rising demand and centralization). The former involves direct
interventions in the functioning of the energy systems, the latter address the
overall structural conditions of these systems.
Addressing causes of disruption of supply the first to mention in the current
global context is terrorism. Iraq shows that infrastructures of oil and gas
production make easy targets for terrorist attack. Since the end of the Baathist
regime in Baghdad, more than 200 attacks on oil production sites, on pipelines,
on hubs, and on port facilities have occurred. This has lead to a significant
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reduction of oil exports, resulting in an estimated financial loss of about $11
billion for Iraq between June 2003 and May 2005. Environmental damage due
to oil spills alongside pipelines also has costly consequences. Saudi-Arabia
spends $1.2—1.5 billion annually for security measures for oil and gas
production, transportation and refining facilities (Gasandoil 2005).
In October 2002, terrorists targeted a French tanker off the coast of Yemen. If
attacks like this one succeed, environmental damage due to the oil spill will
probably be significant. The situation could worsen by an attack at a strategically
relevant so called choke point of tanker transport like the Strait of Hormuz, the
Suez Canal or large terminals. Sinking a tanker would then create a major
disruption (EIA 2004). This is an extreme scenario, but not an unthinkable
one. The number of tanker transports is large (and growing) and security
measures have logistical limits. Thousands of oil and gas production wells are
decentralized, but the logistics of oil and gas depends on a few central “hubs”.
These are loading ports, highly frequented shipping routes, refineries, pipelines
(often with capacities of a million barrels per day or more, in the case of
natural gas, billions of cubic meters capacity per year) and hubs with storage
tanks in areas of high consumption.
The problem of centralized structures is even more apparent in electricity
generation: large generation units and transmission lines (high-voltage grid)
dominate, offering easy targets for terrorist attacks. That there have not been
many such incidents is probably due to the limited effect: modern electricity
grids allow failures and malfunctions of power plants to be compensated for by
other plants. But with nuclear power plants, the issue is not the disruption of
electricity supply but the damage caused by radiation.
The widespread blackouts in the USA, Italy, France and other countries in the
years 2001 to 2004 revealed another type of vulnerability. In partially liberalized
markets, structures with a large degree of centralization are by no means
failsafe. Indeed, resilience decreases under these conditions. Large-scaled
centralization meant that blackouts were also large-scale. Labor unrest is another
cause of disruption to fossil energy supply, giving evidence of how dependent
oil supply and oil prices are to small scale disruptions. In 2004 and 2005,
strikes in Norway, Nigeria and Venezuela led to price jumps on the global
market, although production losses were negligible. The reasons: nervousness
among the market players and general insecurity (“what would happen if more
strikes reduced global supply?”).
Talking about disruption of supply, different patterns have to be discerned.
The general pattern among terrorist attacks and strikes is that disruptions are
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often small or negligible on a global scale (with certain exceptions), that they
are not centrally coordinated by an organizational body, and that they don’t
follow an international strategy.
Political Risk: Arising from Unexpected Sources?
The opposite is the case with political risks. The term is often applied to
describe the situation in the Middle East. The region is usually seen as politically
unstable, constantly threatened by subversion and religious fundamentalism.
Some experts do, however, disagree, believing that countries in the Middle
East are more or less politically stable: they may not be democratically legitimized,
but the ruling elites would not be directly threatened by upheaval and revolution
(Fürtig 2006).
The power of OPEC should not be overestimated. Of course the world is
becoming more dependent on OPEC oil (and gas), and its political power will
therefore increase, and OPEC countries generally seek to maximize profits—
which is a common principle of capitalism. But OPEC is an aggregate of quite
different (developing) countries, each dealing with special challenges like
environmental stress and accompanied health risks for their populations, poverty,
unemployment, and more. Like the consuming countries depending on oil
supply, OPEC countries depend on revenues from oil exports. Extremely high
oil prices bear major risks for OPEC countries themselves, among these are
promotion of alternatives to fossil fuels and reducing dependence on OPEC.
These alternatives have the potential to reduce OPEC power. OPEC´s oil
price corridor (keeping prices between US$ 22—28) was an instrument to
maintain profit maximization and market share without creating the impression
that the eleven countries would blackmail the world with the oil weapon. This
instrument will probably not be used by OPEC anymore, and this scenario
does not seem very realistic. Indeed, OPEC is very much interested in stable
market environments, not only trying to maintain security of supply, but also
claiming “security of demand” from consumer countries (OPEC 2006).
Another setting is a scenario of political overthrow, comparable to the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. If such a regime came into power in Saudi Arabia,
which provides about 15 percent of global oil, the oil weapon could of course
be used, and it would probably be in the logic of Islamic fundamentalism to use
it to harm the economies of the Western societies. However, this is speculation,
and more realistic situations are at hand.
The Ukraine gas conflict shows another facet of political risk, and here it
becomes obvious that political risk is the link between the disruption of supply
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and causes of vulnerability. This conflict was symptomatic—a clear example of
the kind of challenges the future will bring.
The conflict developed as follows. All eastern European countries are somewhat
dependent on Russian natural gas. The same holds true for Western Europe.
Russia wanted Ukraine to pay a “world market rate” for Russian natural gas
(Stern 2006). This position is reasonable, as Ukraine received gas from Russia
at a “friendship rate” in the past. Other countries like Belarus still get gas with
these conditions. So why does Ukraine now have to pay twice as much than
before? Import dependence bears—apart from forgone domestic value
creation—the risk that independence of decision making on international level
is reduced. Import dependence, as a challenge for national energy systems and
cause of vulnerability, is a growing global problem. The consumers on the one
side increase in number (as developing countries enter the global market and
compete for oil and gas) and the consumers increase absolute demand. On
the other side production capacities continue to decrease in the major consumer
regions; the remaining producers thereby increase their power. Growing
demand for oil and shrinking domestic capabilities to meet that demand leads
to enhanced international competition for the remaining oil reserves. For
probable increase of oil import dependence see Figure 1. The global natural
gas system shows a similar pattern of dependence: three regional markets
(North America, Asia, Europe) make dependence on the regional suppliers
even more pronounced, global gas trade can only be accomplished by liquefied
natural gas (LNG), which indeed is becoming more and more attractive for a
variety of players. New players like China will shape the emerging global gas
market. China might import 30 percent of its gas in 2030—up from zero
percent in 2000 (IEA 2004).
Figure 1. Oil import demand of different world regions in percent of total oil demand. (IEA 2002)
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Energy import dependence bears various problems for democratically legitimized
nations. (Solely foreign policy aspects will be discussed in the following.) In the
case of Germany, dependence on Russia is increasing, as imports from Norway,
Great Britain and the Netherlands are decreasing (due to declining production).
In the European Union imports from the Middle East and Russia will increase.
The decision has to be made whether or not dependence on countries which
are lacking democratic legitimization should be increased, dependence on
countries having significantly different ideas of freedom of opinion, of human
rights and other values regarded as conditio sine qua non for democratic
societies. This decision is essential for two reasons:
1) Having to tolerate such structures in energy rich countries leads to the
establishment of double standards, as exactly the same structures are condemned
in other countries. The question of credibility directly arises in this context.
2) Relations with the energy supplying countries can change: political leverage
is narrowed for the importer, “inconvenient views” will probably not be
expressed in the same way as before (Supersberger 2006). On the other hand,
political leverage for the exporter is expanded.
Adding Peak Considerations and Substitution of Energy Sources
Increasing prices have dominated the global energy markets, partly due to
short-term supply shortages, partly due to strong growth of demand, partly
due to tight production characteristics (little spare capacity for oil production).
Most of the relevant non-OPEC oil producers reached production maximum
and have entered the stage of production decline, while the competition for
remaining reserves gets more aggressive (Skrebowski 2004). Expectations are
on OPEC to match increasing demand by increasing production. Yet the cartel
finds itself in a dilemma: it is expected to increase production, hence market
share, but increasing market share is judged by many non-OPEC countries as
a threat to global economy, putting the fate of global economy into the hands
of such a few countries.
Fossil fuels are finite, non-renewable resources. The statement that oil will last
for “another 40 years” at current consumption rate is misleading. Consumption
is increasing (so that current consumption as reference is worthless) and,
more importantly, it is impossible to produce from an oil field at constant rate
until the last recoverable unit is extracted. A realistic production profile generally
follows a bell shaped curve with a production maximum when about fifty
percent of the recoverable oil is produced (the so called depletion mid point),
4 3
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy, Security, and System Transformation
possibly followed by a short plateau (see Figure 2). After this peak production
rate, productivity decreases; the field is then “in decline.” This is valid for
single oil fields as well as their cumulated number on global scale (Aspo 2005,
Laherrere 2004). The discussion focusing on a static range of fossil fuels is
distracting attention from the basic problem: the world will experience supply
restrictions long before the world “runs out of oil”. The crucial point is when
demand further increases but supply cannot follow. The resulting gap will lead
to soaring oil prices.
Figure 2. Production peak for all fossil hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas), as projected by
Aspo (2006).
Substitutes to conventional oil offer numerous opportunities. One branch of
substitutes is utilizing other sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands, heavy and
extra heavy oil production, and synthetic fuels from coal and natural gas. The
second branch of options is comprised of renewable energy sources like wind,
solar energy, biomass, hydrodynamic energy (waves, tides, rivers and storage
lakes) and geothermal energy; and last but not least, enhanced energy efficiency
and energy saving.
Substitution of fossil fuels by other fossil fuels bears numerous counterproductive
effects: the production processes of all the substitutes need more energy and
usually consume more materials, e.g., water, and emit more greenhouse gases.
One of the unsolved problems of using tar sands is their severe environmental
impact on two sides: local damages due to open-pit mining and significant
energy demand for processing and upgrading to synthetic oil, hence increased
greenhouse gas emissions (plus emissions of other pollutants). At present,
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Canadian discussion revolves around whether to use gas to fuel tar sands
production (as hitherto) or to sell gas to the United States directly. Substitution
of conventional oil by natural gas through gas-to-liquid processes (GTL) is an
energy-consuming process with currently low efficiency. The long-term strategic
issue of GTL technologies will be that demand for natural gas would increase
even faster than it already does, and structural supply restrictions of gas would
occur sooner than currently expected. The only answer would be tapping
remote gas resources that can not be used for anything else (Agee 2004,
Syntroleum 2004)1. For coal-to-liquid CTL (Yamashita/Barreto 2003), the
situation is different: In addition to the energy intensity of the process chain
and subsequent increased carbon dioxide emissions (if carbon dioxide capture
and storage proves impracticable), the challenge would be to find a socially
acceptable way of increasing coal production, as in many countries appropriate
standards are lacking. E. g. in China, which will soon build a large-scale CTL-
plant, about 8000 persons die in coal mines per year due to insufficient security
standards (FAZ 2004).
There is discussion as to when this production peak for conventional oil, as
well as for all hydrocarbons, will occur. Some experts hold the view of an early
peak for conventional oil in 2010 or even sooner, other experts speak of a
time frame between 2015 and 2020 or later. A minority deny the possibility of
a production peak at all. This debate often digresses into specific details—and
the context gets lost. This context is the low flexibility of current energy systems.
Inflexibility is the major weakness of current energy systems. They are too
inert to be able to respond to abrupt changes. Adequate reactions on structural
supply restrictions take decades. To recall: the transport systems are almost
totally dependent on oil products; electricity generation depends increasingly
on natural gas (with a major share still from coal); heat production for industry,
commercial and residential sectors use oil and gas. Inertia derives from different
sources, among them consumer behavior, but also powerful lobby groups
trying to prevent system change. On the structural side, inertia results from
the long life-time of power plants (up to 50 years), pipelines and other
infrastructures. Indeed, inertia is used as an argument for keeping current
structures, not initiating structural transformation.
Finding substitutes for fossil fuels has never been regarded as an inert process.
Replacing conventional oil by non-conventional fuels (see above) has always
been judged as a smooth process mainly driven by economic factors. The
1
 For further discussion on cost regimes and other aspects of gas-to-liquid processes see Lounnas/Brennand
2002, RGS 2003, ZDS 2003
4 5
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy, Security, and System Transformation
rationale was that rising oil prices would make fossil alternatives, one after the
other, economically feasible. After reaching cost effectiveness, they would
contribute to the overall energy supply. The error in reasoning is that economical
criteria are not the only influencing factors; the described automaticity only
works in more or less narrow confines. Leaving factors like social acceptance
and environmental sustainability aside, two other essential determinants were
ignored: possible long-term contribution on global or at least national scale,
and velocity of dissemination of alternatives. Even companies investing in tar
sands believe that tar sands products will only play a marginal role for global
supply, and this is due to non-economic reasons (Cox 2004). The velocity of
market introduction of alternatives depends on the time required to build up
significant production capacities, on necessary new infrastructures, long planning
periods for large scale facilities (e.g. power plants), complex research and
development tasks, and restrictions of non-energetic resources essential to
certain technologies.
The previous analysis focused on the vulnerability of energy systems. In sum:
1) Current energy systems are intrinsically vulnerable. The structure of the
systems themselves causes this vulnerability; thus only the alteration of
these structures can mitigate the problem.
2) The current systems are dead ends as they are rooted in the depletion of
exhaustible resources.
3) Rapidly growing import dependence is part of the problem.
4) The large degree of centralization (e. g., in electricity generation) is another.
5) Global energy demand increases, and new players, especially among the
developing countries, start to claim a larger share of the global energy
supply.
6) Competition for energy resources might lead to violent conflicts.
Transformation of the Energy System
as Prerequisite for Future Risk Minimization
The energy infrastructures today are because of the mentioned reasons in
critical condition. Built without considering resource limitations and complex
relationships between diverse players, they are now less able to meet the
needs of modern societies. For the long-run, security of supply without harming
social and environmental contexts can no longer be guaranteed. The current
non-sustainable trends of these energy systems need far-reaching transformation.
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There are two pathways to deal with the challenge of rising energy insecurity,
increasing vulnerabilities and secondary effects of fossil energy use (e. g. climate-
change refugees) (Hennicke/Müller 2005)). The first is coping with the effects
and choosing ever more drastic measures to keep control. As a last resort,
military force would be used, be it for securing supply lines, be it as an instrument
of political pressure, or be it for gaining access to fossil fuel by force. The risks
will not vanish with military involvement. They could only be reduced to a
limited degree. The question arises how fossil-based centralized energy
structures can fit into a setting of increasing global security risks.
The second pathway and a possible way out of the dynamics of ever increasing
risks is a far-reaching transformation of supply and demand structures. This
should be the major task of the coming decades, aiming for security of energy
supply and overall energy security. However, depending on the different players
and their mindsets, the answers to these exigent challenges are often nothing
more than small pieces of a strategy without broader context, with many
players driven by all possible motivations but long-sighted security. This is
valid for Germany as well as the European Union: Even if there are success
stories, a concise and coherent long-term energy strategy is missing. A first
framework for such a strategy should include the following elements:
1) Reduction of relative (and absolute) import dependence to an “acceptable”
level through development of domestic energy sources. The aim would
be to regain control over national energy supply and to minimize
susceptibility to political pressure from supplier countries;
2) Decentralization of the energy system, especially the generation of electricity;
3) Reduction of absolute energy demand by introduction of strong energy
efficiency measures;
4) Development of a new understanding of international cooperation in the
field of energy supply.
Whatever the nature of the specific substitutes, the process of far-reaching
transformation will take 20 to 30 years. Assuming a rather early oil production
peak, say in 2015, natural gas following about twenty years later, would mean
that this.  peak with subsequent decline will aggravate the described situation:
Competition for cheap oil will give way to competition for oil at all. Economies,
hence countries, will become much more vulnerable to (political) pressure
from producer countries. The need for oil could lead nations to deploy military
forces to open access to oil sources. Nations not using such extreme measures
will be left empty-handed. Wars for resources have happened (albeit for other
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reasons than securing supply, e.g., the Biafra-war in the 1960s and in parts the
first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran 1980-88), and they could happen again,
this time for securing supply. The inertia of our energy systems excludes quick
reactions. So the later adequate strategies to react in this inert system are
created, the more pressing  the consequences of these structural production
declines will be.
Options for System Transformation
Decentralization, reduction of vulnerability to external and intrinsic risks,
reduction of import dependence and environmental protection are the four
sides of the energy tetrahedron.
In the following emphasis will be put on Germany. Germany is characterized
by high energy demand and high energy-import dependence, and is in these
respects comparable to many other industrialised countries. Reduction of import
dependence needs to stress use of domestic energy sources. In Germany,
different types of coal and renewable energies can be used, whereas oil is not
available in significant amounts, domestic natural gas playing a minor role as
well. Coal provides about 25 percent of total energy demand, oil products and
natural gas, 36 and 22 percent, nuclear and renewable energies, 13 and 4
percent, respectively. More than 95 percent of consumed oil is imported, more
than 80 percent of natural gas (mainly from Russia), 100 percent of nuclear
fuels. Only hard coal and lignite are produced domestically (but more than
half of hard coal demand is provided by imports). Renewable energies are also
domestically produced.
Although energy intensity (energy used per unit GDP) in Germany is low
compared to world average, many options for further reduction of energy
consumption remain: be it in household appliances, insulation of buildings,
efficient vehicles; be it in energy saving by changing individual behavior, material
efficiency and much more (WEC 2004). Therefore energy efficiency can
contribute significantly to the reduction of total energy consumption and
reduction of absolute import dependence: not using energy means not having
to import it. Benefits like domestic value creation and technology development
(creation of export markets) are also important. Widely achieved energy
efficiency gains will facilitate the transformation of the centralized energy systems
to systems with large shares of decentralized generation, because less energy
demand will naturally reduce the demand for power generating units, hence
making system transformation cheaper than often assumed. The benefits of
small systems are obvious: blackouts will of course still happen, but they will
4 8
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy, Security, and System Transformation
not have severe effects on the economy because they will be limited in dimension.
Resilience will increase. A decentralized system will not offer attractive targets
for terrorist attacks, like large nuclear power plants do. Small systems are in
most cases more efficient (e.g., because no long-distance power lines are
necessary). They are cheaper and faster to build. Furthermore, decentralization
is a prerequisite for the introduction of renewable energies—and vice versa.
Regrettably, the strategic value of renewable energies has gone largely unnoticed.
Two reasons explain this:
1) An underestimation of their potential to contribute to national energy supply;
2) The belief that renewable energies are much more expensive than fossil fuels.
Numerous studies, projects, and governmental expert commissions (e.g., the
Study Commission on Sustainable Energy Supplies in the context of Globalisation
and Liberalisation, initiated by the German Parliament in 2000) have presented
evidence that the potential for renewable energies in combination with energy
efficiency measures in Germany and the European Union is large enough to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent until 2050. In other words,
there are credible substitutes for fossil fuel. This could be accomplished at
acceptable prices and would even be beneficial for the national economy if
external costs were included (German Bundestag 2002, WWF 2005).
Under the premise of increasing vulnerability, the cost regime of different energy
types has to be revised: external costs have to be factored into energy prices.
This means that costs arising from energy use—which are not part of nominal
energy prices—are included in energy cost calculations. External costs arising
from energy use include expenses for repairing environmental damages (local
and global), for curing negative health effects, but also for increased security
efforts throughout the whole supply chain. Internalizing these costs would lead
to a price increase—reflecting “real” energy costs. Under these changing price
conditions, the market will need to reexamine the available energy options. It
will have to recalculate cost effectiveness.
Factoring in external costs, e. g., for electricity, would shift the cost balance in
favor of renewables. High oil and gas prices have already made biomass for
heat generation in buildings competitive. Wind power, and especially geothermal
energy, is still more expensive than electricity produced from coal or natural
gas. The limited time span of technology development—compared with fossil
(and nuclear)–explains the current high cost. Nevertheless, costs are converging.
Learning in the renewable sector and increasing fossil fuel prices are reducing
the price span between renewables and non-renewables.
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The once valid maxim of reliable and cheap energy supply—focusing on the
German (domestic) market and that of the European Union—has to be
broadened to cover more non-energy aspects, as outlined above. Consequently,
apart from current cost differences amongst energy carriers, the relevant issues
are: can we afford to pay less for electricity from fossil sources facing increasing
security challenges? Is the additional price we pay for the reduction of import
dependence too high when each unit of domestically produced energy
strengthens national negotiation leverage in politically difficult times and
immunizes against pressure from energy suppliers?
Our traditional energy systems show structural weaknesses—today more than
ever. Muddling through with these systems seems only second best in the light
of growing national and international insecurities and vulnerabilities. What is
required instead is an energy strategy coordinated among all relevant players
leading to courageous decisions and concrete steps enabling the transformation
to systems intrinsically less vulnerable.
References
AGEE, KENNETH (2004).
Gas to Liquids: Monetizing Remoted Gas Reserves, in:  World Energy,
Vol.7, No.1, 2004
ASPO (2005).
Various newsletters. Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, Uppsala.
www.peakoil.net
ASPO (2006).
Newsletter No. 64, April 2006. Association for the Study of Peak Oil and
Gas, Uppsala. www.peakoil.net
COX, JAMES (2004).
Canada drips with oil, but it’s tough to get at. USA Today, 07.09.2004,
available at www.usatoday.com
EIA (2004).
World Oil Transit Chokepoints. Energy Information Administration, United
States Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. Available at
www.eia.doe.gov
EU (2004).
European Energy and Transport Scenarios on Key Drivers. Directorate
General Energy and Transport, Brussels
5 0
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy, Security, and System Transformation
FAZ (2004).
Wenig Hoffnung auf Überlebende. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Article
available at www.faz.net
FÜRTIG, HENNER (2006).
Wie stabil sind der Nahe und Mittlere Osten und Nordafrika? In: P. Hennicke,
N. Supersberger. Krisenfaktor Öl. In preparation
GASANDOIL (2005).
Newsletter Nr. 10/19, 11.10.2005 unter www.gasandoil.com
GERMAN BUNDESTAG (2002).
Final report of the Study Commission on Sustainable Energy Supplies in the
context of Globalisation and Liberalisation. German Bundestag, 14. elctoral
term. Drucksache 14/9400. 07.07.2002
HENNICKE, PETER, MICHAEL MÜLLER (2005).
Weltmacht Energie. Hirzel, Stuttgart
IEA (2002).
World Energy Outlook 2002. International Energy Agency, Paris
IEA (2004).
World Energy Outlook 2004. International Energy Agency, Paris
LAHERRERE, JEAN (2004).
Oil and Natural Gas Resource Assessment: Production Growth Cycle Models.
Encyclopedia of Energy, Bd. 4, S. 617 – 631
LOUNNAS, REZKI, GARRY BRENNAND (2002).
Oil outlook to 2020. OPEC Review. Bd. 26/2, Juni 2002, S. 81 – 123
OPEC (2006).
Long Term Strategy. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Counties, Vienna
RGS (2003).
Remote Gas Strategies. 10.11.2003. http://www.remotegasstrategies.com/
SKREBOWSKI, CHRIS (2004).
Depletion now running at over 1mn b/d. Petroleum Review, August 2004, S. 42-44
5 1
Vulnerability of Modern Energy Systems:
Implications for Democracy, Security, and System Transformation
STERN, JONATHAN (2006).
 The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006. Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, Oxford. Available at http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/news/Stern,Russian-
U k r a i n i a n % 2 0 g a s % 2 0 c r i s i s % 2 0 o f % 2 0 J a n u a r y % 2 0 2 0 0 6 % 2 0 -
%20OGEL%20(2006).pdf
SUPERSBERGER, NIKOLAUS (2006).
Erneuerbare Energien und Energieeffizienz  als Bestimmungsgrößen politischer
Handlungsfähigkeit. Presenation, Annual Conference Renewable Energy, 21.-
22.02.2006, Berlin
SYNTROLEUM (2004).
GTL: Exploiting Remote Gas Discoveries; www.syntroleum.com
WEC (2004).
Energy Efficiency: A Worldwide Review. World Energy Council in collarboration
with ADEME. World Energy Council, London
WWF (2005).
Target 2020: Policies and Measures to reduce Greenhouse gas emissions in
the EU
YAMASHITA, KEI, LEONARDO BARRETO (2003).
Integrated Energy Systems for the 21st Century: Coal Gasification for Co-producing
Hydrogen, Electricity and Liquid Fuels. IIASA Interim Report IR-03-039
ZDS (2003).
Russians make the case for GTL to transport stranded gas from Siberia. Zeus
Development Corporation. Far East. Remote Gas Strategies, No. 6/2003
